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Abstract. Game-theoretic security resource allocation problems have
generated significant interest in the area of designing and developing
security systems. These approaches traditionally utilize the Stackelberg
game model for security resource scheduling in order to improve the pro-
tection of critical assets. The basic assumption in Stackelberg games is
that a defender will act first, then an attacker will choose their best
response after observing the defender’s strategy commitment (e.g., pro-
tecting a specific asset). Thus, it requires an attacker’s full or partial
observation of a defender’s strategy. This assumption is unrealistic in
real-time threat recognition and prevention. In this paper, we propose
a new solution concept (i.e., a method to predict how a game will be
played) for deriving the defender’s optimal strategy based on the princi-
ple of acceptable costs of minimax regret. Moreover, we demonstrate the
advantages of this solution concept by analyzing its properties.
1 Introduction
Recently, the problem of allocating limited security resources for protecting crit-
ical infrastructure and the general public has attracted significant research inter-
est. In the literature, most existing work deals with this problem in the Stackel-
berg game framework [10, 14]. That is, a defender selects their strategy based on
the assumption that an attacker can observe and understand the defender’s strat-
egy. As a result, the Stackelberg game framework mainly focuses on the effective
scheduling of limited security resources through past experience or knowledge.
Example 1 A surveillance system in an airport has detected that a person has
been loitering in the shopping area excessively. A combination of metal detection
and body-shape image capture at the entrance to the shopping area suggest that
the person may be carrying a gun and a bag. Moreover, there are three critical
assets in the shopping area: a Foreign Currency Exchange office, a Supermarket
and a Jewelry Shop. Suppose there is currently only one security team available,
where should the security team protect?
In this example, using information obtained by the surveillance system and
the event inference method in [7, 15], we can infer the suspect’s motivation, e.g.,
detonating a bomb in a public place, carrying out a robbery, etc. Malevolent
motivations such as these can be used to model subsequent attack preferences
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(e.g., a robber may be more likely to target a bank than a shopping mall, while
a bomber may be more likely to target a shopping mall than a bank). Thus,
we can make use of such motivations as indicators of different types of attacker.
Given that there may be multiple potential targets for an attacker and that a
defender has limited resources for protecting these targets, it is essential for the
defender to determine which target an attacker is most likely to attack. This
type of problem is called a Surveillance Driven Security Resource Allocation
(SDSRA) problem.
Since, in SDSRA problems, security teams act after detecting a potential
threat, it suggests that an attacker and a defender actually execute their actions
simultaneously. This contrasts with the type of security games addressed in [14],
where a security manager assigns a patrol schedule for the security team first
and the attacker then makes their decision based on the observation of the de-
fender’s strategy. As a result, current solution concepts based on the Stackelberg
game framework, such as the Strong Stackelberg equilibrium [14], robust non-
equilibrium solutions [11] and worst-case approaches for interval uncertainty [4],
are not well-suited for modelling SDSRA problems. Moreover, in such games,
since an attacker cannot know a defender’s payoff value as well as a defender’s
probability distribution over different attacker types (motivations), traditional
solution concepts, such as the Bayes-Nash equilibrium [5], cannot handle these
problems either. Therefore, a natural direction is to consider a new game frame-
work and solution concept for handling these SDSRA problems.
In this paper, we propose a principle of acceptable costs of minimax regret
for the SDSRA game model based on three assumptions: (i) influence of loss-
aversion for each player; (ii) minimax regret and loss-aversion based strategy
selection for each player; (iii) knowledge of payoff matrices.1 With this principle,
we propose a method to predict the strategy which will be selected by each type
of attacker and to determine the defender’s optimal strategy. Finally, we analyze
the properties of this new solution concept to justify our framework and suggest
a linear programming implementation. Our main contributions are as follows:
(i) we extend the application of security games to the SDSRA problem; (ii) with
our solution concept, we dynamically predict an attacker’s target/goal based on
information gathered and inferred from an intelligent surveillance system; (iii)
according to an attacker’s strategy, we flexibly determine a defender’s optimal
strategy by balancing the expected payoff for successful threat prevention and
for unaffordable losses caused by failure; and (iv) we validate our method by
analyzing its properties.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 introduces three
assumptions underpinning the new solution concept for the SDSRA problem;
Section 3 predicts the optimal mixed strategy for each possible type of attacker
and analyzes the properties of our attacker strategy prediction method; Section
4 discusses the selection of the optimal strategy for the defender; and Section 5
discusses related work and concludes the paper with future work proposals.
1 A defender’s knowledge of both players’ payoff matrices and an attacker’s knowledge
of their own payoff matrix.
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2 Rationalizability in SDSRA
When a security manager obtains real-time probabilistic surveillance information
[15]2, we can describe the security game for SDSRA as follows:
Definition 1 A security game of SDSRA is a 6-tuple of (N,Θ,A, Ψ,M, U):
– N = {1, 2}, where 1 stands for a defender and 2 stands for an attacker.
– Θ = {t1, . . . , tn}: set of potential types of an attacker.
– A = {Ai | i = 1, 2}: Ai is a pure strategies set of player i. Here, a pure strategy is
an action executed by a player.
– Ψ = {(ak, bl) | ak ∈ A1 and bl ∈ A2}: set of all pure strategy profiles.
– P = {p(t) | p(t) is a probability value for each element t of Θ}.
– U = {ui,t(X) | i ∈ N , t ∈ Θ, X ∈ Ψ}, ui,t(X) is a payoffs function ui,t : Ψ → R}.
The probability distribution P and the defenders utilities (i.e., u1,t(X) for each
t ∈ Θ and X ∈ Ψ) are known only to the defender.
For each player a mixed strategy si is a probability distribution over his set
of pure strategies. The differences between the security game of SDSRA and
the traditional security game are: (i) an attacker and a defender actually take
their actions simultaneously; (ii) a defender’s payoff value for each pure strat-
egy profile is unknown by an attacker; (iii) an attacker is unlikely to know the
defender’s probability distribution over potential attacker types (motivations).
The first difference is the reason that solution concepts for Stackelberg games
are not applicable, while the second and the third differences are the reasons
that the Bayes-Nash equilibrium is not applicable. As a result, we introduce a
new solution concept, called the principle of acceptable costs of minimax regret,
which exploits two factors in decision making under uncertainty: loss-aversion
and regret3. These factors have been identified in the literature and have been
observed in psychological experiments [6, 12]. Similar to the idea of the rational-
izability in the Nash equilibrium [9], we provide three constraints on players for
our solution concept: A1: Each player considers the influence of loss-aversion
(i.e., people’s tendency to strongly prefer ensuring a sufficient minimum payoff
rather than seeking potential maximum utility in decision making). A2: Each
player minimizes their maximum regret based on their attitude towards loss-
aversion and the strategic choices of others. A3: The attacker’s payoffs matrix
is known by the defender and each player knows his own payoff matrix.
Consider assumption A1 first. This idea of loss-aversion has been discussed
extensively in the literature. An example in [12] is, perhaps, the most well-
known. Consider the game in Table 1, where player 1 is the row player and
player 2 is the column player. Clearly, in this game, the payoffs for the unique
Nash equilibrium (( 34A,
1
4B), (
1
2A,
1
2B)) for each player can be guaranteed by
their maximin strategy, i.e., ( 12A,
1
2B) for player 1 and (
1
4A,
3
4B) for player 2. In
the literature [3, 12], many have argued over what strategy should be selected
2 While surveillance information can be represented by some imprecise probability
theories [7], due to space restrictions, in this paper we focus on probability theory.
3 Regret is an emotion associated with decisions which yield undesirable outcomes.
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Table 1. Aumann and Maschler Game
A B
A 1,0 0,1
B 0,3 1,0
by each player: Nash equilibrium or maximin strategies? Some researchers, such
as Harsanyi [3], have further argued that the players should indeed choose their
maximin strategies, since the Nash equilibrium means a player would risk losing
their maximin value without gaining a higher expected utility.
For Assumption A2, it means in our games players will minimize their max-
imum regret based on a threshold, rather that maximize their expect utility
based on the correct subjective beliefs about another player’s strategy. In fact,
many behavioral studies (e.g., [1]) show that human decisions under uncertainty
are strongly influenced by the emotion of regret. The minimax regret principle
suggested in [13] says that a choice is admissible if this choice minimizes the
maximum difference between the outcome of a choice and the best outcome that
could have been obtained in a given state.
Finally, assumption A3 is accepted by solution concepts in the Stackelberg
game framework [14]. Such an assumption is more realistic than the Nash equilib-
rium concept when applied to real-world applications, since this concept assumes
that all player strategies and all player payoffs are common knowledge. Hence,
according to these assumptions, our solution concept should satisfy:
A player is willing to select a strategy with a lower maximum regret, after
considering whether the minimum expected payoff of such a strategy is an ac-
ceptable reduction of their maximin expected payoff.
Actually, this principle has two advantages. Firstly, it avoids the overly pes-
simistic (worst case) approach of the maximin strategy. For example, suppose a
lottery sells tickets for $1 with a 99% chance of winning $5000, then the maximin
strategy would reject the offer. Clearly this violates our intuition. In our princi-
ple, however, if losing $1 is acceptable to a player then this risk will be tolerated.
Secondly, it avoids the potential for unaffordable losses resulting from the mini-
max regret strategy. For example, suppose a lottery sells tickets for $1000 with
a 1% chance of winning $5000, then the minimax regret strategy would always
accept the offer. Clearly this violates our intuition also. In our principle, a player
will consider whether $1000 is an acceptable loss and may or may not accept the
offer. These advantages are useful in real-world security applications, since some
losses are unaffordable (e.g., people’s lives) while an overly pessimistic approach
may mean that a player loses the chance to act.
3 Solution Concept for SDSRA Problem
First, we consider the prediction of the attacker’s strategy. Formally, we have:
Definition 2 Let S2 = {s12, . . . , sm2 , . . . } be a set of mixed strategies for the
attacker, which each mixed strategy is a probability distribution over A2. σ2,t ∈
[0, 1] is the threshold of acceptable cost which an attacker of type t can tolerate
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and at ∈ A1 is a pure strategy of a defender. Then the optimal strategy for the
attacker of type t, denoted as s∗2,t ∈ S2, is given by:
s∗2,t=argmin{r(si2) |r(si2)=max
ah
{max
j 6=i
u2,t(ah, s
j
2)−u2,t(ah, si2)}}, (1)
where
min
as
u2,t(as, s
i
2) ≥ max
sk2
min
ar
u2,t(ar, s
k
2)− ςa,t, (2)
ςa,t = σ2,t(max
sk2
min
ar
u2,t(ar, s
k
2)−min
sl2
min
aw
u2,t(aw, s
l
2)). (3)
Eq. 1 in Def. 2 means that an attacker will select, as their optimal strategy,
a mixed strategy which can minimize their maximum regret. Hence, Eq. 2 limits
the acceptable cost for a given attacker when adopting the minimax regret strat-
egy. That is, the minimum expected utility of the strategy should be higher than
an acceptable reduction of the maximin value. Eq. 2 shows how to calculate the
acceptable reduction, where ςa,t denotes the maximum loss that a type t attacker
might pay in a SDSRA security game. Moreover, σ2,t in Eq. 3 is determined by
an attacker’s type. That is, some attackers will accept a choice with a lower
minimum utility in order to reduce the maximum regret, while some attacker
will refuse a high loss of their minimum utility. In short, the higher the value of
σ2,t, the higher the tolerance for loss of the minimum utility. In real-world ap-
plications, σ2,t can be obtained for each type of attacker from historical data or
from criminology experts. Clearly, different types of attackers will have different
attitudes for loss of the minimum utility. For example, a politically motivated
terrorist usually shows higher tolerance for loss of the minimum utility than a
robber, who is normally more concerned about their own safety.
Now, we consider how to find an optimal strategy for the defender based on
the optimal mixed strategy s∗2,t for each type of attacker and the probability
distribution over the attacker’s possible types. In contrast to traditional security
games, in real-time surveillance systems a defender needs to decide how to act
in order to prevent further actions from the attacker. As a result, since only one
pure strategy will be adopted by one security resource of the defender, we only
need to consider the minimax regret with respect to pure strategies. Thus, using
the same idea as our principle of acceptable costs of minimax regret, we can
select the optimal strategy for the defender by:
Definition 3 Let ai ∈ A1 be a defender’s pure strategy, Θ be the set of possible
types of an attacker, p(t) be the probability value of attacker type t, σ1 ∈ [0, 1]
be the threshold of acceptable cost that a defender can tolerate, and s∗2,t be the
optimal mixed strategy for each type of attacker. Then the defender’s optimal
strategy, denoted as a∗, is given by:
a∗1 = arg max{EU(ai) | EU(ai) =
∑
t∈Θ
p(t)u1,t(ai, s
∗
2,t)}, (4)
where
min
a2,t
∑
t∈Θ
p(t)u1,t(ai, a2,t) ≥ max
ah
min
a2,t
∑
t∈Θ
p(t)u1,t(ah, a2,t)− ςd, (5)
ςd = σ1(max
ah
min
a2,t
∑
t∈Θ
p(t)u1,t(ah, a2,t)−min
al
min
a2,t
∑
t∈Θ
p(t)u1,t(al, a2,t)). (6)
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The reason we adopt the same formula as the maximum expected utility in Eq.
(4) is that the defender already knows the attacker’s optimal mixed strategy s∗2,t
and the probability distribution over the attacker’s possible types. As a result,
according to Assumption 2 and Def. 2, the minimax regret strategy is the same
as the maximum expected utility strategy for the defender. Moreover, since the
attacker’s strategy is based on a judgement of the attacker’s payoff matrix, the
threshold of acceptable cost assumption for each type of attacker, and imperfect
information obtained by surveillance system, there is a chance that the attacker
may play a different strategy than the strategy predicted by the defender. Thus,
Eq. (5) and (6) together guarantee the minimum expected utility for a given
pure strategy is acceptable for the defender.
In fact, a security manager can fine-tune the value of σ1 to reflect different
(real-time) situations for different applications. In this way, our method is more
flexible in balancing the possibility of unaffordable losses caused by the failure
of prevention and the expected payoff for successfully preventing an attack.
4 Properties and Linear Programming
Since the correctness of the defender’s optimal strategy in our method is based on
a prediction of the attacker’s strategy, we consider properties of Def. 2 to justify
the attacker’s strategy prediction method. Moreover, given these properties, the
whole process in our solution concept can be interpreted as an optimization
problem for which there exists efficient methods of computation.
Theorem 1 The maximin strategy of an attacker for our SDSRA security game
is an unique equalizer4.
Proof. Suppose A1 = {a1, . . . .an} is the set of defender’s pure strategies; {q1, . . . ,
qn} is a set of probability values over the set of attacker’s pure strategy A2 =
{b1, . . . , bn}. By the definition of an equalizer, our game has a unique equalizer
if and only if for linear equations Aq = u, where
A=

u2(a1, b1) · · · u2(a1, bn)
...
. . .
...
u2(an, b1) · · · u2(an, bn)
1 · · · 1
 , q=
 q1...
qn
 , u=

c
...
c
1
 ,
there exists a unique solution q. Thus, rank(A) = n. In other word, it requires:
(i) no convex combination of some rows in A dominating convex combinations
of other rows; (ii) the payoff matrix satisfies |A1| = |A2| = n. Since there does
not exist any dominated strategy for the attacker, item (i) holds in our game.
Hence, since the defender and attacker share the same set of targets, item (ii)
also holds in our game. uunionsq
4 Formally, in a two-player game, a probability distribution p for the pure strategies of
a given player i (Ai = {a1, . . . , an}) is an equalizer if and only if there exists c ∈ <
(< is the set of real numbers) and any pure strategy bj for their opponent, s.t. the
following equation holds Σnt=1p(at)ui(at, bj) = c.
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This theorem reveals that an attacker can always find a unique strategy that
guarantees their expected payoff regardless of any mixed strategy of the defender.
Theorem 2 In a SDSRA security game, the expected payoff of the maximin
strategy will not be less than a completely mixed Bayes-Nash equilibrium.
Proof. Since in a completely mixed bimatrix game, each player can guarantee
the expected payoff from a completely mixed equilibrium by playing a maximin
strategy if and only if such a strategy is an equalizer [12]. By Theorem 1, and
the fact that a Bayesian game in which the type space is finite can be redefined
as a normal form game in which the strategy space is finite dimensional [9], this
result can be obtained directly. uunionsq
Since our games satisfy that no pure or mixed strategy of an attacker or
defender is strictly or weakly dominated by a convex combination of their other
strategies, Theorem 2 shows that in many cases, an attacker can guarantee that
their expected payoff is not less than the completely mixed Bayes-Nash equilib-
rium by selecting a maximin strategy.
Theorem 3 Suppose ah is a pure strategy for the defender, bk is a pure strategy
for the attacker, then the maximin regret rt(s
i
2) for the attacker’s (of type t)
strategy si2 in a SDSRA security game can also be obtained as follows:
rt(s
i
2)=max
ah
{max
bk
u2,t(ah, bk)−u2,t(ah, si2)}
Proof. Given the linearity of payoff functions and the fact that there does not
exist any dominated strategy for the attacker, we obtain this result directly. uunionsq
This Theorem means that we only need to consider the pure strategy of the
attacker when considering the maximin regret strategy of the attacker.
Theorem 4 Suppose ah is a defender’s pure strategy, bk is an attacker’s pure
strategy, and the payoff value of successfully attacking each target is the same
for an attacker with a given type t (u2,t(ai, bj) = u2,t(as, br), i 6= j, s 6= r), then
the minimax regret strategy is the same as the maximin strategy for the attacker.
Proof. Suppose the maximin strategy for an attacker of a given type t is s2. By
Theorem 1, for any defender’s pure strategies ai and as, we have u2,t(ai, s2) =
u2,t(as, s2). Then, by Theorem 3 and u2,t(ai, bj) = u2,t(as, br) > u2,t(ak, bl), for
any i 6= j, s 6= r, k = l,5 we have
rt(s2) = u2,t(ah, bk)−u2,t(ah, s2), for any h 6= k.
Suppose there exists a minimax regret strategy s∗2 6= s2, then we have rt(s∗2) ≤
rt(s2). Given the uniqueness of the equalizer (Theorem 1) and u2(ai, bj) =
u2(as, br), i 6= j, s 6= r, we have rt(s∗2) 6= rt(s2). Moreover, by rt(s∗2) < rt(s2), for
5 k = l means that both players select the same target (i.e., the attacker loses), while
i 6= j and s 6= r mean that players select different targets (i.e., the attacker wins).
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a given defender’s pure strategy ai, we have u2,t(ai, bk)−u2,t(ah, s∗2) < u2,t(ai, bk)−
u2,t(ai, s2), i 6= k. Then, we have u2,t(ah, s∗2) > u2,t(ai, s2). Since s2 is a maximin
strategy, there exists a pure strategy as, such that u2,t(as, s
∗
2) < u2,t(as, s2). So,
we have u2,t(as, bk)−u2,t(as, s∗2) > u2,t(as, bk)−u2,t(as, s2), s 6= k. It violates our
assumption that rt(s
∗
2) ≤ rt(s2). So, s∗2 = s2. uunionsq
Theorem 3 demonstrates that if the payoff value of successfully attacking
each target is the same for an attacker with a given type, then he can choose
their maximin strategy to guarantee their minimum payoff value as well as to
reduce their maximum regret in our games. Also, the relationship between Def.
2 and the decision rule of minimax regret [13], as well as that of Γ -maximin [9]
is as follows:
Theorem 5 Let σ2,t ∈ [0, 1] be the threshold of acceptable cost that an attacker
of type t can tolerate, and s∗2,t be the optimal strategy for attacker type t, accord-
ing to the principle of acceptable costs of maximum regret:
(i) if σ2,t = 1, then s
∗
2,t is also an optimal choice according to the rule of
minimax regret; and
(ii) if σ2,t = 0, then s
∗
2,t is also an optimal choice according to the rule of
Γ -maximin.
Proof. (i) From Eq. (2) and (3) and the fact σ2,t = 1, a mixed strategy s
i
2 can
be any element in the set of mixed strategies S2. Then, from Eq. (1), s
∗
2,t is also
an optimal choice according to the rule of minimax regret. (ii) From Eq. (1), (2),
and (3), with σ2,t = 0, s
∗
2,t can only be an element with the maximin utility in
the set of mixed strategies S2,t. Thus, s
∗
2,t is also an optimal choice according to
the Γ -maximin rule. uunionsq
Actually, given Def. 2 and 3 as well as Theorems 1 and 3, the whole process
of finding a defender’s optimal strategy based on the strategy selected by each
possible type of attacker can be solved by two Linear Programs as follows6:
min
{qtj}
r2,t({qtj})
s.t. r2,t({qtj}) ≥ (u2,t(ah, bk)−
n∑
i=1
qtju2,t(ah, bj))(∀ah, ∀bk)
n∑
j=1
qtju2,t(ah, bj) ≥ (1− σ2,t)C2,t + σ2,tV2,t (∀ah)
C2,t =
n∑
l=1
qtlu2,t(as, bk) (as ∈ A1)
V2,t = min{u2,t(ah, bk)} (∀ah, ∀bk)
n∑
j=1
qtj = 1, q
t
j ∈ [0, 1]
6 Since a defender may have multiple available security resources, our Linear Programs
will also consider this situation based on Def. 3
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max
{xi}
n∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
∑
t∈Θ
p(t)xiu1,t(ai, bj)q
t
j
s.t.
n∑
i=1
∑
t∈Θ
p(t)xiu1,t(ai, bj) ≥ (1− σ1)C1 + σ1V1
C1 = max{
∑
t∈Θ
p(t)u1,t(ai, bj)}
V1 = min{
∑
t∈Θ
p(t)u1,t(ai, bj)}
n∑
i=1
x∗i = k, x
∗
i ∈ {0, 1}
The first LP aims to find the mixed strategy selected by each possible type
of attacker {qjt } based on our principle while the second LP aims to find the
defender’s optimal strategy {xi}. For the first LP, the objective function and
the first constraint represent Eq. 1, the second, third and fourth constraints
represent Eq. 2 and 3 (where {qt1, . . . , qtn} is the probability distribution for a
type t attacker’s unique equalizer strategy), the fifth constraint limits the set
{qtj} as a probability distribution over the set of actions A2. For the second LP,
the objective function represents Eq. 4, the first, second and third constraints
represent Eq. 5 and 6, and the fourth constraint limits the strategies selected by
a defender being a pure distribution over A1 (that is, pi = 1 or pi = 0) and the
amount of available security resources.
5 Conclusion
Related Work: Recently, security games have received increasing attention
when aiming to solve security resource allocation problems [14]. Much of the
work deals with this problem within the Stackelberg game framework [5, 8, 10].
That is, a defender commits to a strategy first and an attacker chooses their
strategy based on the defender’s commitment. The typical solution concept is
the Strong Stackelberg Equilibrium, which assumes that an attacker will always
break ties in favor of a defender in the case of indifference [5]. However, it is
not always intuitive in real-world applications: how can an attacker observe
the defender’s strategy in a real-time, interactive environment? Thus, our work
provides a more reasonable solution concept based on the principle of acceptable
costs of minimax regret. On the other hand, in recent years there has been an
increase in the deployment of intelligent surveillance systems, largely in response
to the high demand for identifying and preventing threats for public safety, e.g.,
suspect object tracking [2] and anti-social behavior analysis [7]. However, to
the best of our knowledge, little work of this kind focuses on how to allocate
security resources to prevent possible attacks based on incomplete information
in a surveillance system.
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Conclusion: This paper proposed a new solution concept to handle SD-
SRA security games based on the principle of acceptable costs of minimax re-
gret. Firstly, we discussed the rationalizability assumptions of our principle: loss-
aversion, minimax regret, and knowledge of the payoff matrix. Then, based on
this principle, we proposed a method to predict the attacker’s strategy and to de-
termine the optimal strategy for the defender. Finally, we validated our method
with some properties and provided a Linear Program for our solution concept.
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